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Although the instant case deals solely with the standing-to-sue issue, Chief
Judge Desmond's dissent forecasts an interesting dilemma. If the case would now
go back to the trial court, and plaintiff is able to prove his allegations against the
majority trustee, may the defense of an overriding fiduciary obligation to a
trust be raised? For example, let us suppose the trier of fact finds that the
majority trustee, as director of the corporation, is not acting in the best interests
of the corporation. Could defendant argue that he is, however, acting in the best
interests of his trust, as is his fiduciary duty, and adherence to that duty takes
precedence over his fiduciary duty as a director? "Where the trustee holds
sufficient shares to control actually or substantially the conduct of the corpor32
ation, he is under a duty to exercise that control for the benefit of the trust."
There is no public policy which precludes the owner of a majority of shares of
a corporation from creating a trust, thereby giving the trustee the power to control the election of directors and the ultimate control over the affairs of the
corporation.3 3 It has been held that such power is an incident merely of the
ownership of the stock "and unless abused" 3 4 will not be denied. The courts
have allowed such a trustee wide areas of discretion,35 and they have been
reluctant to interfere unless he is guilty of an abuse of his discretionary powers.30
Where the trustee exceeds the limitations of reasonable judgment in the exercise
of control over the corporation, the court will intervene, either by directing him
37
in the exercise of the power or holding him liable for its improper exercise.
Thus, in the instant case, to succeed plaintiff will be required below to prove that
the defendant trustee has abused the discretion allotted him by the trust indenture. If defendant can show that his actions are in the best interests of the
majority, the majority stockholder, he will be deemed to be acting within the
realm of proper discretion.
JOHN

T. O'MAnA

FAMILY LAW
ANTI-HEART BALM ACT-LEGAL SUEFICIENcY OF ACTION FOR MONEY DAMAGES
BASED ON BOGUS WEDDING CEREmONY

After being led to believe that the defendant intended to marry her, plaintiff participated in what she believed to be a genuine wedding ceremony. In fact,
32. 2 Scott, Trusts § 193.2 at 1462 (2d ed. 1956). Accord, Mudd v. Lanier, 247 Ala. 363,
24 So. 2d 550 (1945); Tapper v. Boston Chamber of Commerce, 235 Mass. 209, 126 N.E.
464 (1920). See Krasnowiecki, Existing Rules of Trust Administration: A Stranglehold on the
Trustee-ControlledBusiness Enterprise, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 816 (1962).
33. Union Trust Co. of Springfield v. Nelen, 283 Mass. 144, 148, 189 N.E. 66, 69
(1933).
34.

Ibid.

35. 2 Scott, Trusts § 187 (2d ed. 1956).
36. Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N.E. 647 (1930). Cf. Matter of Ebbets, 139

Misc. 250, 248 N.Y. Supp. 179 (Surr. Ct. 1931).

37. In re Adler's Estate, 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1937); In re
McLaughlin's Estate, 164 Misc. 539, 299 N.Y. Supp. 559 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
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it was a sham, contrived in detail by the defendant with faked papers, pretended
judge and witnesses. The bogus ceremony took place in New Jersey, after which
the plaintiff and defendant returned to New York City. They cohabited there
as man and wife for approximately nine months. At this time plaintiff was first
informed that the ceremony was a sham, having no legal effect, and that
defendant planned to leave her and marry another. Both plaintiff and defendant
are citizens of New York state. Plaintiff's first cause of action was brought in
deceit, alleging the above facts. Defendant moved to dismiss, contending that:
(1) the action was improperly brought in fraud and deceit; (2) the action
should have been brought in the form of seduction and breach of promise to
marry and, as such, is outlawed by the so-called Anti-Heart Balm Act.' The
Supreme Court, at Special Term, denied the motion to dismiss. The Appellate
Division reversed on the law and granted the defendant's motion.2 The Court of
Appeals, one judge dissenting without opinion, held, motion to dismiss denied.
The action of deceit will lie where it is grounded on a putative marriage produced by a sham civil ceremony, for the harm complained of arises from the
genuine belief of a change of status by the plaintiff, and not from the underlying unfulfilled promise to marry. Tuck v. Tuck, 14 N.Y.2d 341, 200 N.E.2d
554, 251 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1964).
Following the lead of the Indiana legislature, 3 New York passed the AntiHeart Balm Act in 1935." It specifically abolished civil causes of action for
breach of promise to marry and for seduction, criminal conversation, and
alienation of affection, when involving a sum of money in damages. 5 Changing
mores of the community and the increased social status of women underlay the
need for legislation. The number of unfounded actions, the possibility of
1. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 263, § 1, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1939, chs. 356, 359,
(formerly N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 61-a-61-i, now N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 80-84).
2. 18 A.D.2d 101, 238 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1st Dep't 1963). The Court was divided, voting
3 to 2 to reverse.
3. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-508 (1946). Other states with similar legislation: Alabama
(Ala. Code fit. 7, § 114 (1958)); California (Cal. Civ. Code § 43.5 (1960)); Colorado
(Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-3-1 (1953)); Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 771.01 (1963)); Maine
(Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 112, § 91 (1954)); Maryland (Md. Ann. Code art. 75C, § 2
(1957), breach of promise to marry action abolished "except in cases wherein pregnancy
exists"): Massachusetts (Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 207, § 47A (1955)); Michigan (Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 25.191 (1956)); Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.380 (1963)); New Hampshire (N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508.11 (1955)); New Jersey (N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:23-1 (1937));
Pennsylvania (Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 48, § 171 (1958)); Wyoming (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-7271-731 (1957)). An Illinois statute was declared unconstitutional in Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill.
296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946). Illinois has since enacted a statute outlawing punitive damages
as a part of breach of promise to marry suits (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 89, §§ 25-34 (1947)).
A Tennessee statute, rather than abolish such causes of action, has stiffened requirements as to
evidentiary proof (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-701-36-706(1955)). For discussion of constitutionality and application of such statutes, see Annot., 158 A.L.R. 617 (1945), as supplemented, 167 A.L.R. 235 (1947).
4. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 263, § 1, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1939, chs. 356, 359
(formerly N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 61-a-61-i, now N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 80-84).
5. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 263, § I (formerly N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 61-b, now N.Y.
Civ. Rights Law § 80). In contrast, the Indiana statute abolished "all civil causes of action,"
rather than just "rights of action . . . to recover sums of money as damage." Ind. Ann.
Stat. § 2-508 (1946).
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coercive extra-judicial settlements or marriages motivated by fear of a law suit
instead of love, and the excessive verdicts granted in the occasional meritorious
case by both jury and court, spoke out for legislative action. The need for legal
protection of the individual in his or her affectional relationships had been exceeded by the social cost of allowing such remedies.0 From the outset, courts
have been cautious not to allow any action resembling even remotely a breach of
promise suit, fearing that the statute would be undermined. Consequently, suits
brought on theories of assault,7 false representation,8 and fraud and deceit have
been rejected as an attempt to circumvent the prohibition of the statute. The
New York Anti-Heart Balm Act specifically requires that its provisions be
liberally construed. 10 Accordingly, the courts have dismissed all causes of action,
where allegation or proof of either seduction or breach of promise to marry is
required to sustain an action." Gifts made in conjunction with a contract to
12
marry, for instance, are not retrievable on the breach or rescission thereof,
although such actions would appear to lie outside the statute's policy provi3
sions.1
In a leading New York case' 4 plaintiff sued in deceit alleging that the
defendant, a married man, represented that he was unmarried, and that in
reliance on his representation plaintiff agreed to marry him. No marriage ensued.
In affirming defendant's motion to dismiss, the court emphasized that had there
6. See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 263, § 1, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1939, ch. 359,
(formerly N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 61-a); Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 273, 5 N.E.2d
815, 817 (1936); see generally Feinsinger, Current Legislation Affecting Breach of Promise
to Marry, Alienation of Affections and Related Actions, 10 Wis. L. Rev. 417 (1935);
Feinsinger, Attack on Heart Balm, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 979 (1935); Note, 11 Temp. L.Q. 396
(1937).
7. Thibault v. Laliumiere, 318 Mass. 72, 60 N.E.2d 349 (1945).
8. Sulkowski v. Szewczyk, 255 App. Div. 103, 6 N.Y.S.2d 97 (4th Dep't 1938).
9. A.B. v. C.D., 36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1940), aff'd, 123 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 691 (1941); Thibault v. Laliumiere, 318 Mass. 72, 60 N.E.2d 349
(1945); Tuck v. Tuck, 18 A.D.2d 101, 238 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1st Dep't 1963).
10. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 263, § 1 (formerly N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 61-h, now
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 84).
11. Andie v. Kaplan, 263 App. Div. 884, 32 N.Y.S.2d 429 (2d Dep't 1942), aff'd, 288
N.Y. 685, 43 N.E.2d 82 (1942); Sulkowski v. Szewczyk, 255 App. Div. 103, 6 N.Y.S.2d 97
(4th Dep't 1938).
12. Mastersanti v. Mascioli, 13 A.D.2d 865, 214 N.Y.S.2d 932 (3d Dep't 1961) (real
property); Brandes v. Agnew, 275 App. Div. 843, 88 N.Y.S.2d 553 (2d Dep't 1949) (real
property); Morris v. Baird, 269 App. Div. 948, 57 N.Y.S.2d 890 (2d Dep't 19,15), 14 Fordham L. Rev. 223 (1945) (real property) ; Josephson v. Dry Dock Say. Institution, 266 App.
Div. 992, 45 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1st Dep't 1943), aff'd, 292 N.Y. 666, 56 N.E.2d 96 (1944) (gifts);
Andie v. Kaplan, supra note 11 (money and jewelry); see Note, 48 Cornell L.Q. 186 (1962).
13. "[These] actions . . . having been subject to grave abuses, causing extreme
annoyance . . . and pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent . . . , and such
remedies having been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment, and...
having furnished vehicles for the commission . . . of crime and . . . the perpetration of
frauds, . . . the best interests of the people of the state will be served by . . . [their]
abolition." N.Y. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 263, § 1, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1939, ch. 359
(formerly N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 61-a) (emphasis added). Further, specific abolition is

limited to cases where plaintiff seeks to recover ". . . sums of money as damages for . . .
breach of contract to marry, . . ." N.Y. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 263 § 1 (formerly N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Act § 61-b, now N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 80) (emphasis added).
14. Sulkowski v. Szewczyk, 255 App. Div. 103, 6 N.Y.S.2d 97 (4th Dep't 1938).
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not been, (1) a promise to marry, and (2) a failure to keep such promise by
the defendant, the action would fail on the merits. Therefore, the action was
clearly based upon a breach of promise to marry and within the purview of the
statute abolishing such actions.' 5 Under a similar set of facts a lower court
found that an action for deceit would lie, however.1 6 Here, the fraud was not
discovered in time, and plaintiff was induced into a bigamous marriage. The
court reasoned that an action to recover damages, when a consummated
marriage is involved, is neither subject to abuse or manipulation by unscrupulous
persons, nor within the letter of spirit of the law.' 7 The chances of intimidation
by threat of an unfounded suit are slight when a marriage is a prerequisite to
the action, and the danger of a coerced marriage is non-existent. The courts
then have looked to the consummated marriage as the distinguishing factor.
When no ceremony has been performed, the courts dismiss the action as being
violative of the Anti-Heart Balm Act.18 When a ceremony has been performed,
the cause of action is sustained.' 9
The majority, in the instant case, starts with the valid premise that an
action of fraud and deceit will lie in New York where the defendant induces the
plaintiff to marry by fraudulently representing that he is unmarried, and
analogizes the present case to such an action. Fraud, with respect to one's
capacity to marry, is similar to fraud with respect to a pretended ceremony in
15. Id. at 105, 6 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
16. Snyder v. Snyder, 172 Misc. 204, 14 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Sup. Ct. 1939). Although
Snyder was not the first case to decide that fraud and deceit is a proper action when a
consummated bigamous marriage is involved (see Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434 (1868)),
it was the first case to establish clearly that this position was unaffected by the Anti-Heart
Balm Act outlawing actions based on breach of promise to marry. Accord, Friedman v.
Libin, 4 Misc. 2d 248, 157 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 3 A.D.2d 827, 161 N.Y.S.2d
826 (1st Dep't 1957); Benintendi v. Benintendi, 1 Misc. 2d 474, 72 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup. Ct.
1947), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 969, 79 N.Y.S.2d 303 (2d Dep't 1948), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 848, 84
N.E.2d 150 (1949).
17. Snyder v. Snyder, supra note 16, at 205, 14 N.Y.S.2d at 816. See Note, 18 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 198 (1940), where Snyder and Sulkowski v. Szewczyk, 255 App. Div. 103,
6 N.Y.S.2d 97 (4th Dep't 1938), are compared and contrasted. In a more recent case, a
further attempt was made to show why a breach of promise to marry is not at the basis of
an action when there is a consummated bigamous marriage involved: ". . . plaintiff does not
here assert that the [defendant] wronged her in failing to marry her; rather, she is asserting
that [defendant) wronged her in fraudulently inducing her to marry him. The plaintiff's
complaint is based on what the [defendant] did do and not on what he refused to do."
Friedman v. Libin, supra note 16, at 255, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
18. Cases cited note 11 supra.
19. Cases cited note 16 supra. But cf., Grunberg v. Grunberg, 199 Misc. 249, 99
N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Bressler v. Bressler, 133 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Munic. Ct. N.Y.C.
1954), where the distinction made with regard to the consummated marriage ceremony cases
has not met with success. Both actions were brought in tort to recover gifts given just
before and immediately after a valid consummated marriage. Each action was dismissed
as arising from the outlawed breach of promise to marry action (the courts viewed
the marriage contract as a continuing obligation on the part of both parties, and
therefore, when defendant left plaintiff, he breached his promise, and an action based on
that breach could not stand). The two cases have drawn little judicial comment in New
York. (In Friedman v. Libin, 4 Misc. 2d 248, 255, 157 N.Y.S.2d 474, 484, (Sup. Ct. 1956) the
court said only: "I disagree with them.") It is interesting, however, that both cases were cited
and ultimately followed in a recent California case. Boyd v. Boyd, 228 Cal. App. 2d 425, 39
Cal. Rptr. 400 (3d Dist. 1964).
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that both situations require affirmative steps on the part of the defendant and
both lead to equally void relationships. 20 Although a promise of marriage underlies a fraudulent ceremony (similar to the outlawed actions), the breach of such
promise is not the wrong complained of in this action. The woman who is
seduced under the promise of marriage knows the relationship into which she is
entering. In the instant case, however, good faith of a supposed change of status
led the plaintiff to believe that the subsequent cohabitation was as man and
wife; whereas, this "change of status" is completely lacking in cases grounded
on breach of promise alone. Finally, since the purpose of the Anti-Heart Balm
Act is to eliminate fraud, the courts should not extend it by construction to
assist in the perpetration of fraud and to allow exploitation of the marriage
ceremony. Representing the majority of the Appellate Division, 2 1 Justice Eager
reasoned that since the present case was within the definitional boundaries of
seduction, 22 since the damages sought were identical to those sought under the
outlawed breach of promise to marry action,2 3 since an unfulfilled promise to
marry was necessarily an element in the cause of action,2 4 and since the parties
did not partake in a valid marriage ceremony, the present case had all the
typical earmarks of the actions outlawed by the statute. In addition, the statement of public policy,25 interpreted in the light of the provision mandating a
liberal construction,2 6 makes the legislative intent to outlaw all such civil suits
for damages unmistakable. Furthermore, the court reasoned, the legislature had
in mind specific provisions of the Penal Code27 to right the wrongs in this area of
the law to the extent that they are to be righted at all. Therefore, in those
instances (the present case included) 23 where defendants are subject to
criminal punishment, the legislature intended the corresponding civil action to
20. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 6 (a bigamous marriage is void); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 11
(no marriage shall be valid unless solemnized).
21. 18 A.D.2d 101, 238 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1st Dep't 1963).
22. "By its generally accepted definition, the term 'seduction' means the act of a man
in inducing a woman to commit unlawful sexual intercourse with him by means of arts,
persuasions, solicitations, promises, bribes or other means, without the employment of force."
79 C.J.S. Seduction § 1, at 953 (1952).
23. The damages granted under a breach of promise to marry suit have traditionally
been more closely related to actions ex delicto than ex contractu; however, see McCormick
on Damages, § 111 (1935); 11 C.J.S. Breach of Promise to Marry § 40 (1938).
24. As no marriage took place between plaintiff and defendant in the eyes of the
court, plaintiff's claim must have been based on a promise by defendant, an action for the
breach of which is barred by the Anti-Heart Balm Act.
25. See note 13 supra.
26. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 263, § 1 (formerly N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 61-h, now
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 84).
27. N.Y. Penal Code § 2175.
28. "A person, who under promise of marriage, or by means of a fraudulent representation to her that he is married to her, seduces and has sexual intercourse with an
unmarried female of previously chaste character, is punishable by imprisonment for not more
than five years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or both." N.Y. Penal
Code § 2175. Whether the New York courts would have jurisdiction over the present
defendant is open to question, as the bogus wedding ceremony took place in New Jersey.
That the crime could be construed to be a continuing one or one which was committed
partly in New York, see N.Y. Penal Code § 1930.
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be outlawed by the Anti-Heart Balm Act. 9 Justice Eager also attacked the
proposition that the instant case is similar in all pertinent respects to the cases
involving consummated bigamous marriages. He pointed out that: (1) The
gravamen of a case involving a bigamous marriage is not the unfulfilled promise
but rather the fraudulent consummation of a marriage, and (2) The solemnization of a bigamous marriage is in accordance and conformity with the law and is
only void or voidable because of facts apart from the solemnization. As such,
the cause of action founded on the consummated bigamous marriage cannot be
freely manipulated, whereas the case involving the unrecorded bogus ceremony
is still subject to the feared abuses and "legalized blackmail." Moreover, the
paramount importance of the marriage institution requires that the woman
should have a responsibility, as well, to see that the requirements of the law are
met with respect to the licensing and solemnization.
In response to the Appellate Division decision and its factual distinction
between a sham ceremony and a duly celebrated bigamous ceremony, one
commentator has observed: "The plaintiff would appear to be as effectively
unmarried and seduced in one case as in the other."2 0 For this reason alone, it
seems plaintiff should be allowed a cause of action in fraud and deceit. In an
attempt to support such a holding, the Court of Appeals cited the few cases
decided in other jurisdictions involving a sham ceremony.31 They appear of
little value, however, as not one of them had to face the question whether an
action for fraud and deceit would lie when confronted with a statute abolishing
the heart balm remedies.32 This does not detract from the overall soundness of
Judge Fuld's opinion, however. The instant case is not particularly significant
when looked at for its narrow precedential value. Few cases will come before
the bar with such an elaborate and imaginative set of facts. Nor does it seem
probable that the gates are opened to future plaintiffs, claiming reliance on the
other party's assurances as to validity of common law marriages, 33 and thereby
29. Conversely, it can be argued, if the legislature intended to withdraw civil remedies
where N.Y. Penal Code § 2175 provided penal provisions, why didn't the legislature make
reference to the code provision, or at least use comparable wording? To the degree that
§ 2175 has an effect on the Anti-Heart Balm Act, it is significant that § 2175 has no
counterpart in the Proposed New York Penal Law, unless it be § 135.20 (Sexual misconduct; a class A misdemeanor).
30. Glasser, Torts, 1963 Survey of New York State Law, 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 339, 343
(1963).
31. Jekshewitz v. Groswald, 265 Mass. 413, 164 N.E. 609 (1929); Sears v. Wegner,
150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224 (1907); Alexander v. Kuykendall, 192 Va. 8, 63 S.E.2d 746
(1951).
32. Another case cited did deal wvith a similar Anti-Heart Balm Statute in California.
Spellens v. Spellens, 305 P.2d 628 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1956). (Here, it appears that the
marriage was solemnized by an offical celebrant). Plaintiff sought (1) a declaration of the
validity of her marriage to the defendant by "estoppel", or (2) in the alternative, should the
marriage be determined to be invalid, damages for fraud and deceit. The Appellate Court
upheld her action for fraud and deceit. The holding, however, was rendered "dicta", by the
California Supreme Court decision, 49 Cal. 2d 213, 317 P.2d 613 (1957), holding for plaintiff on the first ground, leaving unnecessary the question posed in the second ground.
33. A consequence alluded to by the Appellate Division majority decision: "Obviously,
if this action be maintainable, then an illicit relationship entered into on the basis of a
promise to marry could, be readily maneuvered by a party into an actionable status by a
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withstanding a motion to dismiss. The factual distinctions between such a
common law marriage case and the present case are evident, and while decision
in each case would rely upon the same competing values of (1) the need for
the plaintiff to be redressed, and (2) the percentage of fraudulent cases that
would come about by allowing such actions, these factual distinctions should
lead to a distinction of law. The present case is significant, however, when seen
in the light of the twenty-nine year history of the Anti-Heart Balm Act. The
courts appear to have bent over backward to protect the integrity of the statute
in its early years, denying causes of action which only collaterally approach the
traditional breach of promise suit. The instant case suggests that new stock is
being taken of cases that approach the outlawed actions. The ever present fear
that the statute would be undermined is virtually unwarranted. The statute has
withstood the test of time and can now be viewed objectively. Specifically, cases
involving suits for the return of gifts made in reliance of marriage promises, 84 at
least when such promises are breached by the defendant or mutually rescinded,
should be reappraised by the courts 5 or the legislature.3, By denying relief to a
party, who seeks only the return of gifts given in consideration of marriage,
little social benefit is attained; in fact, ultimate harm to society would be the
more probable result. Few, if any, of the elements of fraud, associated with the
breach of promise suit asking for personal damages, are present when the relief
sought 'is the return of property. Furthermore, under the present law, the
remediless party is at the mercy of unscrupulous individuals. An "enriched"
party can breach the promise of marriage, and openly admit fraud in doing
such, without fear of action. In this respect the Anti-Heart Balm Act has become, rather than a shield to save, a sword to desecrate.
STEPHEN KELLOGG
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The parties, husband and wife, became estranged after the husband admitted his interest in another woman. Plaintiff wife at first decided to obtain
a divorce, but then changed her mind and consulted counsel with a view toward
claimed reliance . . .as to the validity of a common law or other putative marriages."

Tuck v. Tuck, 18 A.D.2d 101, 107, 238 N.Y.S.2d 317, 323 (1st Dep't. 1963).
34. Cases cited note 12 supra.
35. As the courts have "made" the law in regard to these cases (see note 13 and
accompanying text), they can judicially overrule it. Few courts in other states agree with the
New York court's view of the Anti-Heart Balm Act and its application to recovery of
ante-nuptial gifts, e.g., Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger, 390 Pa. 502, 136 A.2d 127 (1957) and its
interpretation of a similar statute. See generally Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 956 (1960); Note, 48
Cornell L.Q. 186 (1962).
36. The New York Law Revision Commission in 1947 suggested an amendment to
the statute: "This article shall not be deemed to prevent a court in the proper case from
granting restitution for property or money transferred in contemplation of the performance
of an agreement to marry which is not performed." 1947 Report of N.Y. Law Revision
Commission 225. After this amendment had passed both houses, the bill was vetoed by the
Governor, without memorandum. Public Papersof Thomas .E. Dewey, p. 286 (1947).

